Energy-only or capacity market? How wholesale markets are designed for high renewable shares
Clear a year of hourly prices, watch solar’s value fall as it grows, then pay for peakers two ways
- Analyst · L2
- 30 min guided · about 30 min practice
- After lesson 8
- Completed
The Plains market for one year: 3,000 MW of wind, 1,200 MW of solar, 700 MW of gas peakers (illustrative)
- On a spring midday wind and sun exceed demand and the price is −$25.00/MWh; on a summer evening only 401 MW are spare and scarcity pricing lifts it to $586.76.
- Over the year the price averages $35.79/MWh, with 111 negative-price hours and 155 scarcity hours.
- From 1,200 to 2,800 MW of solar, solar's capture price falls from $33.16 to $7.38 per MWh.
- Energy-only, a new peaker falls $25 per kW a year short of its fixed cost; at 600 MW of peakers a new one pays, and the year has 2 hours short.
- Existing peakers cover their upkeep up to 900 MW, so from 700 to 900 MW none is built and none retires: simplified thresholds.
- With the simplified capacity market, its price set to fill a new peaker's gap, the capacity price is $191/MW-day; consumers pay $40.79/MWh against $39.89 energy-only (table below).
| New plant | Fixed cost ($/kW a year) | Margin after running costs, energy-only | Margin with the payment, simplified capacity market |
|---|---|---|---|
| Wind farm | $134 | $160 | $162 |
| Solar farm | $109 | $122 | $118 |
| Gas combined cycle | $72 | $84 | $84 |
| Gas peaker | $74 | $49 | $74 |
| Consumers pay ($/MWh) | – | $39.89 | $40.79 |
| Where | How capacity is paid for | Sources |
|---|---|---|
| U.S. markets with a capacity market | An energy market with shortage pricing, plus auctions that buy capacity ahead of time: PJM's base auction is normally held three years before the delivery year; MISO's auction has run by season since 2023. PJM's capacity price was $269.92/MW-day for most of its region in 2025/26 (two zones cleared higher, at their caps) and $325, at the cap, for its entire region in 2028/29. | FERC staff, Energy Primer (December 2023), p. 72; PJM Manual 18, Rev. 63 (effective 24 September 2026), section 5.1; PJM, 2028/2029 auction release (14 July 2026); PJM, 2025/2026 auction release (30 July 2024); PJM, 2025/2026 Base Residual Auction report; MISO, news release (17 May 2023): the new seasonal approach |
| Texas (ERCOT) | An energy market with no capacity market; offers are capped at $5,000/MWh. A reserve demand curve added a scarcity adder from 2014; since 5 December 2025, energy and reserves are priced together. The offer cap fell from $9,000 to $5,000 per MWh on 1 January 2022. | ERCOT, 2024 Biennial Report on the ORDC (1 November 2024), pp. 1 and 7–10; ERCOT market notice M-F110525-04 (5 December 2025): real-time co-optimization live; ERCOT market notice M-A120721-01 (7 December 2021); FERC staff, Energy Primer (December 2023), p. 66 |
| U.S. regions without a regional market (RTO) | Utilities, frequently vertically integrated, own and run plants and wires and plan their supply with their state regulators. About two-thirds of the U.S. population is served by markets that RTOs run; much of the rest by these utilities. | FERC staff, Energy Primer (December 2023), pp. 60 and 66 |
| The European Union | Energy markets set the wholesale price; a country may add a capacity mechanism, approved as state aid. The 2024 reform entered into force on 16 July 2024; from 17 July 2027, new direct price support for wind, solar and some other plants must be two-way contracts for difference: top-ups below an agreed price, paybacks above. | European Commission, Electricity market design (page accessed 5 November 2026); Regulation (EU) 2024/1747, Article 19d, adopted 13 June 2024 (Official Journal, 26 June 2024): two-way contracts for difference from 17 July 2027; European Commission, questions and answers QANDA/24/2260 (21 May 2024); European Commission, news (12 March 2025) |
| China | Capacity payments set nationally, technology by technology, coal's since 2024; a January 2026 notice revised them and set a national framework for grid-side storage. Coal's payment covered 30% of a set fixed cost in most provinces in 2024–25 and at least 50% from 2026. Once a province's spot market runs continuously, one payment for reliable capacity is to replace payments by technology. | NDRC, questions and answers with NDRC and National Energy Administration officials on the notice improving the generation-side capacity price mechanism (30 January 2026); Ember, From baseload to flexibility: How is coal's role in China changing (10 February 2026), section 1.3.1, pp. 14–16 |
With JavaScript on, you clear hours and a year, add solar, move the peaker fleet and switch between the two designs.
- A teaching market: the Plains market's fleet, the coal offer, the $25 credit, the scarcity curve and the capacity market's $1,000 cap are illustrative.
- Real shapes: the Southwest Power Pool's 2025 demand, wind and sun (EIA-930), scaled to EIA's 2025 capacity factors.
- Gas running costs and new plants' building and upkeep costs are lesson 7's, from EIA, in 2025 dollars, at 4% real over 30 years.
- One year, every unit at its average availability: no random outages (A5 adds them), no network, no imports.
- The $5,000/MWh cap is ERCOT's offer cap since 1 January 2022. Here it also caps the clearing price, a simplification; real rules differ in many details.
- The capacity market is simplified: its price is set to fill a new peaker's gap, with no auction against a requirement.
Need a refresher? Lesson 8 (merit order and the clearing price) and lesson 7 (what electricity costs to make).
What you just did, as diagrams
- Energy-only market
- No separate capacity payment: energy and reserve prices, high in a few scarce hours, pay for capacity that is rarely used.
- Capacity market
- A planner sets how much capacity to buy, and an auction pays for it on top of energy prices; this lesson's version is simplified.
- Reserve products
- Spare capacity is priced hour by hour together with energy, in either kind of market.
- Capture price
- The average price a plant's output earns; for solar it falls as more solar sells in the same hours.
- Missing money
- The gap between what a needed plant earns from energy and reserves and what it costs to keep.
Go deeper · AnalystWhat the toy leaves to real markets
- Scarcity curves are drawn by rules. ERCOT priced reserves with an operating reserve demand curve from 2014; since 5 December 2025 it prices energy and reserves together.
- Capacity demand curves. Real auctions buy along a sloped curve, not a fixed amount, with caps and floors set in tariffs.
- Accreditation moves money. A capacity price is paid on rated MW, so the ratings of lesson A5 decide who earns it.
Go deeper · ModelerThe clearing in symbols
- Price. With spare \(s_t \ge 0\) MW: \(p_t = c_{m(t)} + (\bar p - c_{m(t)})\,\max(0, 1 - s_t/600)^2\) per MWh, where \(c_{m(t)}\) is the last offer needed and \(\bar p\) the cap.
- Short. With \(s_t < 0\), demand exceeds supply: \(p_t = \bar p\) and \(-s_t\) MW go unserved. So \(p_t \le \bar p\) in every hour.
- Margin. A plant earns \(\sum_t (p_t - c)\,q_t\) a year, with \(q_t\) its MWh in hour \(t\) and \(c\) its running cost; wind and solar earn \(\sum_t (p_t + 25)\,q_t\), the credit included.
- Capacity price. \(\max(0, F - \pi)/0.93\) per rated kW a year, with \(F\) a new peaker’s fixed cost and \(\pi\) its energy margin per kW: the gap is filled by construction.
Check yourself
Myth or fact? “A negative price means the market is broken.”
- Myth
- Fact
Answer
Myth. It means the last offer needed would rather pay than stop: here wind and solar keep a $25 credit per MWh, in 111 hours of the year.
Myth or fact? “A solar farm earns about the average market price.”
- Myth
- Fact
Answer
Myth, once solar is common. Here its capture price is 93% of the average at 1,200 MW and 32% at 2,800 MW. In CAISO in 2023 solar's value factor, a broader measure with capacity value, was 38%.
Myth or fact? “An energy-only market avoids paying for capacity.”
- Myth
- Fact
Answer
Myth. It pays through scarcity prices instead: with 700 MW of peakers here, consumers pay $39.89/MWh energy-only and $40.79/MWh with the simplified capacity market.
Myth or fact? “A capacity auction clearing at its cap can mean thinner reserves without certain outages.”
- Myth
- Fact
Answer
Fact. PJM's 2028/29 auction cleared at its cap, 6,831 MW short of its requirement, measured against a standard of one shortfall event in ten years.
The last offer needed is $39.37/MWh, the cap $5,000 and 401 MW are spare against a 600 MW threshold. Roughly what is the price, with the lesson's curve?
- $39.37
- $5,000
- About $585
- About $1,690
Answer
39.37 + (5,000 − 39.37) × (1 − 401 ÷ 600)² = 39.37 + 4,960.63 × 0.110 ≈ $585 per MWh. Step 1 shows $586.76: its spare is 400.7 MW before rounding.
A capacity price of $69.59 per kW a year is how much per MW-day?
- $69.59
- About $191
- $25,400
- $0.19
Answer
69.59 × 1,000 ÷ 365 = 190.66, about $191 per MW-day: kW to MW, a year to days.
Numbers, sources and what’s next
Numbers to remember
| Number | What it means | Source |
|---|---|---|
| $5,000/MWh | ERCOT's system-wide offer cap since 1 January 2022, down from $9,000. | ERCOT notice M-A120721-01 · 7 December 2021 |
| $325/MW-day | PJM's 2028/29 capacity price, at its cap, for its entire region; $269.92 for most of its region in 2025/26. | PJM release · 14 July 2026 |
| 38% | Solar's value factor in CAISO in 2023 (energy plus capacity value, over a flat block's), where solar served 27% of load. | LBNL, Utility-Scale Solar 2024, slides 47 and 50 |
| 16 July 2024 | The EU's electricity market design reform enters into force. | European Commission · accessed 5 November 2026 |
Keep going
Sources and further reading
- FERC staff (2023). Energy Primer: A Handbook of Energy Market Basics (PDF), December 2023. Traditional markets: p. 60. RTOs and ERCOT: p. 66. Capacity auctions and shortage pricing: p. 72.
- ERCOT (2024). 2024 Biennial Report on the Operating Reserve Demand Curve (PDF), 1 November 2024, pp. 1 and 7–10; and market notice M-F110525-04 (5 December 2025).
- PJM. Manual 18: Capacity Market (PDF), Rev. 63, effective 24 September 2026, section 5.1; 2025/2026 auction report; 2025/2026 auction release (30 July 2024); 2028/2029 auction release (14 July 2026).
- MISO. News release on the seasonal capacity auction (17 May 2023).
- European Commission. Electricity market design; questions and answers (21 May 2024); capacity mechanisms (12 March 2025). Regulation (EU) 2024/1747, Article 19d (Official Journal, 26 June 2024): two-way contracts for difference from 17 July 2027.
- NDRC (2026). Questions and answers with NDRC and National Energy Administration officials on the notice improving the generation-side capacity price mechanism, 30 January 2026.
- Ember (2026). From baseload to flexibility: How is coal's role in China changing (PDF), 10 February 2026, section 1.3.1, pp. 14–16. Ember compiles official sources.
- LBNL (2024). Utility-Scale Solar, 2024 Edition (slides), October 2024, slides 47–50.
Spotted an error, or stuck? Write to hlli@ksu.edu. Corrections are made in place and dated here.
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